Scan report
Resinat / Resin
Could an attacker exploit mistakes in this code?
Serious issues. Review the high-severity findings before using it.
- High
- 8
- Medium
- 33
- Low
- 0
Sources: Bandit, Semgrep, pip-audit
Does this code look like it is trying to cause harm?
Minor issues. Worth a glance, unlikely to be urgent.
- High
- 0
- Medium
- 4
- Low
- 3
Sources: YARA, ClamAV, GuardDog, dependency checker
- Likely real
- 40
- Uncertain
- 5
- Likely noise
- 3
The risk classifier rates every finding for how likely it is to be a real issue. Likely noise still counts, just much less.
What we found, in plain English
The repository Resinat/Resin has a high vulnerability risk score of 120.0, which means the code contains many insecure patterns that an attacker could easily exploit to break things. While there are also some signs of potentially malicious intent with a low score of 14.0, these appear to be ordinary coding mistakes rather than intentional attacks. The most serious issues involve SQL injection risks from user-controlled data and dangerous dynamic ClientTrace functions that could allow attackers to bypass security controls. Additionally, the code uses methods like math/rand instead of the safer crypto/rand, and there are several references to downloading remote resources which could be unsafe if not handled correctly. Overall, while some issues look like standard errors, the combination of these vulnerabilities makes it important for developers to review and fix them before using this code in production.
Written by a local language model from the findings below. The risk scores come from the classifier, not from this summary.
Detections by engine
Score over time
Overall score each time this repository was scanned.
Findings
Highest severity first. Select a finding to see the code and what it means.
-
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/requestlog/schema.go line 110
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected string concatenation with a non-literal variable in a "database/sql" Go SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if the variable is user-controlled and not properly sanitized. In order to prevent SQL injection, use parameterized queries or prepared statements instead. You can use prepared statements with the 'Prepare' and 'PrepareContext' calls.
if _, err := db.Exec(stmt); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/requestlog/schema.go line 117
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected string concatenation with a non-literal variable in a "database/sql" Go SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if the variable is user-controlled and not properly sanitized. In order to prevent SQL injection, use parameterized queries or prepared statements instead. You can use prepared statements with the 'Prepare' and 'PrepareContext' calls.
rows, err := db.Query(fmt.Sprintf("PRAGMA table_info(%s)", table)) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/state/consistency.go line 23
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected string concatenation with a non-literal variable in a "database/sql" Go SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if the variable is user-controlled and not properly sanitized. In order to prevent SQL injection, use parameterized queries or prepared statements instead. You can use prepared statements with the 'Prepare' and 'PrepareContext' calls.
if _, err := cacheDB.Exec(attachSQL); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/state/migrate.go line 152
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected string concatenation with a non-literal variable in a "database/sql" Go SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if the variable is user-controlled and not properly sanitized. In order to prevent SQL injection, use parameterized queries or prepared statements instead. You can use prepared statements with the 'Prepare' and 'PrepareContext' calls.
if err := db.QueryRow(fmt.Sprintf("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM %s", table)).Scan(&count); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/state/schema.go line 55
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected string concatenation with a non-literal variable in a "database/sql" Go SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if the variable is user-controlled and not properly sanitized. In order to prevent SQL injection, use parameterized queries or prepared statements instead. You can use prepared statements with the 'Prepare' and 'PrepareContext' calls.
if _, err := db.Exec(stmt); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/state/schema.go line 62
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected string concatenation with a non-literal variable in a "database/sql" Go SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if the variable is user-controlled and not properly sanitized. In order to prevent SQL injection, use parameterized queries or prepared statements instead. You can use prepared statements with the 'Prepare' and 'PrepareContext' calls.
rows, err := db.Query(fmt.Sprintf("PRAGMA table_info(%s)", table)) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /Dockerfile line 49
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
CMD ["/usr/local/bin/resin"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /Dockerfile line 48
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/proxy/reverse.go line 332
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected a potentially dynamic ClientTrace. This occurred because semgrep could not find a static definition for 'upstreamTrace.clientTrace()'. Dynamic ClientTraces are dangerous because they deserialize function code to run when certain Request events occur, which could lead to code being run without your knowledge. Ensure that your ClientTrace is statically defined.
reqCtx := httptrace.WithClientTrace(req.Context(), upstreamTrace.clientTrace()) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/proxy/forward.go line 252
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected a potentially dynamic ClientTrace. This occurred because semgrep could not find a static definition for 'upstreamTrace.clientTrace()'. Dynamic ClientTraces are dangerous because they deserialize function code to run when certain Request events occur, which could lead to code being run without your knowledge. Ensure that your ClientTrace is statically defined.
outReq = outReq.WithContext(httptrace.WithClientTrace(outReq.Context(), upstreamTrace.clientTrace())) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/proxy/reverse.go line 337
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected a potentially dynamic ClientTrace. This occurred because semgrep could not find a static definition for 'reporter.clientTrace()'. Dynamic ClientTraces are dangerous because they deserialize function code to run when certain Request events occur, which could lead to code being run without your knowledge. Ensure that your ClientTrace is statically defined.
reqCtx = httptrace.WithClientTrace(reqCtx, reporter.clientTrace()) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/outbound/secure_dns.go line 223
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Downcasting or changing sign of an integer with `uint16` method
port, err := strconv.Atoi(portRaw) if err != nil || port < 1 || port > 65535 { return "", 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid port %q", portRaw) } return host, uint16(port), nil -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /webui/src/features/platforms/PlatformAccessPanel.tsx line 232
- Likely real
- Yes, 97% confidence
Detects URLs to URL shorteners, file sharing, and suspicious services [threat-network-outbound-shady-links]
shellQuote(forwardCredential), shellQuote("https://api.ipify.org"), ].join(" "); const curlReverse = reverseUrl ? `curl ${shellQuote(reverseUrl)}` : ""; -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /webui/src/features/platforms/PlatformAccessPanel.tsx line 180
- Likely real
- Yes, 97% confidence
Detects URLs to URL shorteners, file sharing, and suspicious services [threat-network-outbound-shady-links]
const [token, setToken] = useState(loadStoredProxyToken); const [target, setTarget] = useState("https://api.ipify.org"); const envQuery = useQuery({ -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /webui/src/i18n/translations.ts line 340
- Likely real
- Yes, 97% confidence
Detects URLs to URL shorteners, file sharing, and suspicious services [threat-network-outbound-shady-links]
"目标网址": "Target URL", "例如 https://api.ipify.org": "e.g. https://api.ipify.org", "反向代理地址": "Reverse Proxy URL", "请输入合法的 http/https 目标网址以生成反向代理地址。": -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /webui/src/features/platforms/PlatformAccessPanel.tsx line 327
- Likely real
- Yes, 97% confidence
Detects URLs to URL shorteners, file sharing, and suspicious services [threat-network-outbound-shady-links]
id="access-target" placeholder={t("例如 https://api.ipify.org")} value={target} onChange={(event) => setTarget(event.target.value)} -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/proxy/reverse.go line 324
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
ReverseProxy can remove headers added by Director. Consider using ReverseProxy.Rewrite instead of ReverseProxy.Director.
Director: func(req *http.Request) { req.URL = target req.Host = parsed.Host stripForwardingIdentityHeaders(req.Header) pendingEgressHeaderBytes = headerWireLen(req.Header) // Compose request-progress trace first so egress commit logic can // observe whether the upstream request was actually written. reqCtx := httptrace.WithClientTrace(req.Context(), upstreamTrace.clientTrace()) // Add httptrace for TLS latency measurement on HTTPS. if parsed.Protocol == "https" && hasRoute && p.health != nil { reporter := newReverseLatencyReporter(p.health, nodeHashRaw, domain) reqCtx = httptrace.WithClientTrace(reqCtx, reporter.clientTrace()) } *req = *req.WithContext(reqCtx) }, -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/state/migrate.go line 152
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data.
if err := db.QueryRow(fmt.Sprintf("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM %s", table)).Scan(&count); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/state/schema.go line 54
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data.
stmt := fmt.Sprintf("ALTER TABLE %s ADD COLUMN %s", table, columnDDL) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/state/schema.go line 62
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data.
rows, err := db.Query(fmt.Sprintf("PRAGMA table_info(%s)", table)) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/state/consistency.go line 22
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data.
attachSQL := fmt.Sprintf("ATTACH DATABASE %q AS state_db", stateDBPath) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/requestlog/schema.go line 109
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data.
stmt := fmt.Sprintf("ALTER TABLE %s ADD COLUMN %s", table, columnDDL) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/requestlog/schema.go line 117
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data.
rows, err := db.Query(fmt.Sprintf("PRAGMA table_info(%s)", table)) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 167
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v4 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 217
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: docker/build-push-action@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 208
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: docker/metadata-action@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 191
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: docker/login-action@v3 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 188
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 185
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 176
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 170
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 148
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 132
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 120
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v4 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 106
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 98
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 47
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/setup-go@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 36
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/setup-node@v4 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 33
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v4 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/close-inactive-issues.yml line 15
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/stale@v10 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/proxy/errors.go line 93
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
w.Write([]byte(pe.Message)) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/platform/routableview.go line 5
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
"math/rand/v2" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/probe/manager.go line 6
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
"math/rand/v2" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/routing/random.go line 5
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
"math/rand/v2" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /internal/scanloop/scanloop.go line 4
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
"math/rand/v2" -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /internal/config/env.go line 138
- Likely real
- Yes, 93% confidence
Detects reading of environment variables (credential access, often contains secrets) [threat-runtime-environment-read]
// --- Auth (tokens must be defined; empty means auth disabled) --- authVersionRaw := os.Getenv("RESIN_AUTH_VERSION") adminToken, hasAdminToken := os.LookupEnv("RESIN_ADMIN_TOKEN") proxyToken, hasProxyToken := os.LookupEnv("RESIN_PROXY_TOKEN") -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /cmd/resin/app_runtime.go line 47
- Likely real
- Yes, 91% confidence
Detects access to sensitive files (credentials, configs, keys) [threat-filesystem-read]
func run() error { if err := loadDotenvFile(".env"); err != nil { return err } -
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker-compose.yml.example
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
No findings match these filters.