Scan report
kserve / kserve
Could an attacker exploit mistakes in this code?
Strong warning signs. Do not run or install this without a careful review.
- High
- 47
- Medium
- 587
- Low
- 301
Sources: Bandit, Semgrep, pip-audit
Does this code look like it is trying to cause harm?
Minor issues. Worth a glance, unlikely to be urgent.
- High
- 26
- Medium
- 3
- Low
- 140
Sources: YARA, ClamAV, GuardDog, dependency checker
- Likely real
- 98
- Uncertain
- 21
- Likely noise
- 985
The risk classifier rates every finding for how likely it is to be a real issue. Likely noise still counts, just much less.
What we found, in plain English
This repository has two distinct security issues that need immediate attention before it can be used in production. The most critical finding is a Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability caused by untrusted user input, which means an attacker could potentially steal data or inject malicious code into web pages. Additionally, the code uses dangerous shell commands and processes files without proper validation, creating another layer of risk that attackers might exploit to run harmful scripts. While there are some signs of potential malicious intent, these appear to be standard insecure coding patterns rather than intentional attacks, so they can be addressed through routine code reviews. However, because the overall vulnerability score is extremely high at 864.0, the repository should not be deployed until these critical flaws are fixed by the development team.
Written by a local language model from the findings below. The risk scores come from the classifier, not from this summary.
Detections by engine
Score over time
Overall score each time this repository was scanned.
Findings
Highest severity first. Select a finding to see the code and what it means.
Large result: showing the top 431 of 1,104 findings (up to 200 per engine, most severe and most likely real first). Totals above include everything.
-
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /cmd/router/main.go line 419
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Untrusted input could be used to tamper with a web page rendering, which can lead to a Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability. XSS vulnerabilities occur when untrusted input executes malicious JavaScript code, leading to issues such as account compromise and sensitive information leakage. To prevent this vulnerability, validate the user input, perform contextual output encoding or sanitize the input. For more information, see: [Go XSS prevention] (https://semgrep.dev/docs/cheat-sheets/go-xss/).
if _, err := w.Write(response); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /cmd/router/main.go line 411
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Untrusted input could be used to tamper with a web page rendering, which can lead to a Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability. XSS vulnerabilities occur when untrusted input executes malicious JavaScript code, leading to issues such as account compromise and sensitive information leakage. To prevent this vulnerability, validate the user input, perform contextual output encoding or sanitize the input. For more information, see: [Go XSS prevention] (https://semgrep.dev/docs/cheat-sheets/go-xss/).
if _, err := w.Write(prepareErrorResponse(err, "Failed to process request")); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/storage/kserve_storage/kserve_storage.py line 1713
- Likely real
- Yes, 67% confidence
tarfile.extractall used without any validation. Please check and discard dangerous members.
1712 with zipfile.ZipFile(file_path, "r") as archive: 1713 archive.extractall(target_dir) 1714 except (tarfile.TarError, zipfile.BadZipfile) as e: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/xgbserver-docker-publisher.yml line 112
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/kserve-dep-setup/action.yml line 33
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | shopt -s nocasematch echo "Selected network layer ${{ inputs.network-layer }}" ./test/scripts/gh-actions/setup-deps.sh ${{ inputs.deployment-mode }} "${{ inputs.network-layer }}" "${{ inputs.enable-keda }}" "${{ inputs.deploy-llmisvc }}" "${{ inputs.autoscaler }}" "${{ inputs.observability }}" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/load-docker-images/action.yaml line 16
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | max_retries=3 while IFS= read -r file; do filename=$(basename "${file}") echo "Verifying ${filename} ($(du -h "${file}" | cut -f1))" if tar tf "${file}" > /dev/null 2>&1; then continue fi echo "::warning::${filename} is corrupted or truncated, attempting re-download" for attempt in $(seq 1 ${max_retries}); do echo "Re-downloading artifact matching ${filename} (attempt ${attempt}/${max_retries})" rm -f "${file}" retry_dir=$(mktemp -d) # Artifact names follow the convention "<prefix>-<tar filename>" dl_stderr=$(mktemp) if gh run download "${GITHUB_RUN_ID}" --pattern "*-${filename}" -D "${retry_dir}" 2>"${dl_stderr}"; then found_file=$(find "${retry_dir}" -name "${filename}" -type f | head -1) if [ -n "${found_file}" ] && tar tf "${found_file}" > /dev/null 2>&1; then mv "${found_file}" "${file}" rm -rf "${retry_dir}" "${dl_stderr}" echo "Successfully re-downloaded ${filename}" break fi else echo "Download failed: $(cat "${dl_stderr}")" fi rm -rf "${retry_dir}" "${dl_stderr}" if [ "${attempt}" -eq "${max_retries}" ]; then echo "::error::Failed to download a valid ${filename} after ${max_retries} attempts" exit 1 fi sleep $((attempt * 5)) done done < <(find "${{ inputs.directory }}" -maxdepth 1 -type f) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/load-docker-images/action.yaml line 53
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | while IFS= read -r file; do echo "Loading image $(basename "${file}")" docker image load -i "${file}" done < <(find "${{ inputs.directory }}" -maxdepth 1 -type f) rm -rf "${{ inputs.directory }}" docker image ls -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/agent-docker-publish.yml line 112
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/artexplainer-docker-publish.yml line 112
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/autogluonserver-docker-publish.yml line 112
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/automated-release.yml line 34
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | GOPATH=$(go env GOPATH) KSERVE_PATH=$GOPATH/src/github.com/kserve/kserve echo "KSERVE_PATH=$KSERVE_PATH" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" mkdir -p $KSERVE_PATH cp -a . $KSERVE_PATH cd $KSERVE_PATH export RELEASE_BRANCH=${{ inputs.releaseBranch }} export RELEASE_TAG=${{ inputs.releaseTag }} # Bump Versions make bump-version ./hack/release/generate-install.sh $RELEASE_TAG make uv-lock # Update Release Branch and Push Tag git diff git config --global user.email "terrytangyuan@gmail.com" git config --global user.name "terrytangyuan" git add -A git commit -m "Prepare release" || exit 0 git push -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/custom-model-grpc-publish.yml line 101
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/huggingface-cpu-docker-publish.yml line 104
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/huggingface-docker-publish.yml line 104
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest # Add "-gpu" suffix to the version VERSION="${VERSION}-gpu" echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/kserve-controller-docker-publish.yml line 111
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/kserve-llmisvc-controller-docker-publish.yml line 104
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/kserve-localmodel-agent-docker-publish.yml line 111
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/kserve-localmodel-controller-docker-publish.yml line 111
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/lightgbm-docker-publish.yml line 112
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/paddle-docker-publish.yml line 112
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/transformer-docker-publish.yml line 193
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$GRPC_IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/transformer-docker-publish.yml line 103
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/tf2openapi-docker-publisher.yml line 100
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/storage-initializer-ppc64le-docker-publisher.yml line 96
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/storage-initializer-docker-publisher.yml line 111
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/sklearnserver-docker-publish.yml line 112
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/router-docker-publish.yml line 111
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/qpext-docker-publish.yml line 100
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/prepare-release.yml line 92
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | VERSION="${{ inputs.version }}" # Check if version contains rc (pre-release) if [[ "$VERSION" == *"-rc"* ]]; then PRERELEASE="--prerelease" echo "Creating draft pre-release for $VERSION" else PRERELEASE="" echo "Creating draft final release for $VERSION" fi # Get previous tag for changelog PREV_TAG=$(git describe --tags --abbrev=0 HEAD^ 2>/dev/null || echo "") # Generate auto-generated notes from GitHub echo "Generating release notes..." AUTO_NOTES=$(gh api repos/:owner/:repo/releases/generate-notes \ -F tag_name="$VERSION" \ -F target_commitish="$(git rev-parse HEAD)" \ ${PREV_TAG:+-F previous_tag_name="$PREV_TAG"} \ --jq .body) # Create release notes RELEASE_NOTES=$(cat <<EOF ## Installation - [Installation Guide](https://kserve.github.io/website/docs/next/getting-started/quickstart-guide) ${AUTO_NOTES} EOF ) # Create GitHub Release with install files gh release create "$VERSION" \ --title "KServe $VERSION" \ --notes "$RELEASE_NOTES" \ --draft \ $PRERELEASE \ install/${VERSION}/* echo "" echo "✅ GitHub Draft Release created successfully!" echo "" echo "Release details:" echo " Version: $VERSION" echo " Type: ${PRERELEASE:+Pre-release}${PRERELEASE:-Final release}" echo " Status: Draft (requires manual publish)" echo "" echo "Next steps:" echo " 1. Review the draft release at:" gh release view "$VERSION" --json url -q .url echo "" echo " 2. When ready, publish the release to trigger:" echo " - Helm charts publication (helm-publish workflow)" echo " - Python packages publication (python-publish workflow)" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/prepare-release.yml line 81
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | if [[ "${{ inputs.dry_run }}" == "true" ]]; then ./hack/release/create-release.sh "${{ inputs.version }}" --dry-run --github-actions else ./hack/release/create-release.sh "${{ inputs.version }}" --github-actions fi -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/prepare-release.yml line 65
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | VERSION="${{ inputs.version }}" if gh release view "$VERSION" >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo "" echo "❌ Release $VERSION already exists!" echo "" gh release view "$VERSION" --json url,createdAt -q '"URL: " + .url + "\nCreated: " + .createdAt' exit 1 fi echo "✅ Release $VERSION does not exist yet" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/predictiveserver-docker-publish.yml line 115
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/pmml-docker-publish.yml line 112
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/mcv-docker-publish.yml line 92
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | IMAGE_ID=kserve/$IMAGE_NAME # Change all uppercase to lowercase IMAGE_ID=$(echo $IMAGE_ID | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]') # Strip git ref prefix from version VERSION=$(echo "${{ github.ref }}" | sed -e 's,.*/\(.*\),\1,') # Strip "v" prefix from tag name # [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/tags/"* ]] && VERSION=$(echo $VERSION | sed -e 's/^v//') # Use Docker `latest` tag convention [ "$VERSION" == "master" ] && VERSION=latest echo VERSION=$VERSION >> $GITHUB_ENV echo IMAGE_ID=$IMAGE_ID >> $GITHUB_ENV -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/generate-versions-from-gomod.py line 54
- Likely real
- Yes, 55% confidence
Found 'subprocess' function 'run' with 'shell=True'. This is dangerous because this call will spawn the command using a shell process. Doing so propagates current shell settings and variables, which makes it much easier for a malicious actor to execute commands. Use 'shell=False' instead.
cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/storage/kserve_storage/kserve_storage.py line 1709
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 47% confidence
Possible path traversal through `tarfile.open($PATH).extractall()` if the source tar is controlled by an attacker
with tarfile.open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as archive: archive.extractall(target_dir, filter="data") -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/generate-versions-from-gomod.py line 54
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 33% confidence
subprocess call with shell=True identified, security issue.
53 return subprocess.run( 54 cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True 55 ).stdout 56 57 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /Dockerfile line 39
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT ["/manager"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /agent.Dockerfile line 40
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT ["/ko-app/agent"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/kserve_migration/Dockerfile line 14
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT ["./kserve_migration.sh"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /kernelcache-agent.Dockerfile line 22
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT ["/manager"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /llmisvc-controller.Dockerfile line 39
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT ["/manager"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /localmodel-agent.Dockerfile line 40
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT ["/manager"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /localmodel.Dockerfile line 39
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT ["/manager"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /qpext/qpext.Dockerfile line 37
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT ["/ko-app/qpext"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /router.Dockerfile line 40
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT ["/ko-app/router"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /tools/tf2openapi/Dockerfile line 26
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT ["/tf2openapi"] -
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/custom_model/model.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 3% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_base64_exec — Encoded payload decoded and then executed
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/custom_model/model_remote.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 3% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_base64_exec — Encoded payload decoded and then executed
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /kernelcache/mcv/capture-entrypoint.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/huggingface_server_cpu.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /kernelcache/mcv/mcv.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/autogluon.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/lgb.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/pmml.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sklearn.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/custom_transformer_grpc.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/success_200_isvc.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/artexplainer.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/paddle.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/xgb.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/aiffairness.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/custom_tokenizer.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/custom_transformer.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/error_404_isvc.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/custom_model.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/predictiveserver.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/generate-versions-from-gomod.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/huggingface_server.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/storage-initializer.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/custom_model_grpc.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /tools/tf2openapi/DEVELOPER_GUIDE.md
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_persistence_mechanism — Modifies a startup/scheduling location - legitimate application code essentially never does this
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/huggingface_server_cpu.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_persistence_mechanism — Modifies a startup/scheduling location - legitimate application code essentially never does this
-
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/storage/kserve_storage/kserve_storage.py line 1388
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected a python logger call with a potential hardcoded secret "Retrieved SP token credential for client_id: %s" being logged. This may lead to secret credentials being exposed. Make sure that the logger is not logging sensitive information.
logger.info("Retrieved SP token credential for client_id: %s", client_id) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/kserve_migration/kserve_migration_job.yaml line 13
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Semgrep detected a Kubernetes core API ClusterRole with excessive permissions. Attaching excessive permissions to a ClusterRole associated with the core namespace allows the V1 API to perform arbitrary actions on arbitrary resources attached to the cluster. Prefer explicit allowlists of verbs/resources when configuring the core API namespace.
resources: ["*"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/kserve_migration/kserve_migration_job_kubeflow.yaml line 13
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Semgrep detected a Kubernetes core API ClusterRole with excessive permissions. Attaching excessive permissions to a ClusterRole associated with the core namespace allows the V1 API to perform arbitrary actions on arbitrary resources attached to the cluster. Prefer explicit allowlists of verbs/resources when configuring the core API namespace.
resources: ["*"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/huggingfaceserver/pyproject.toml line 20
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
This pyproject.toml configures uv but does not set a dependency cooldown. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add `exclude-newer = "7 days"` under `[tool.uv]` to wait 7 days before resolving newly published package versions. Added in: 0.9.17 Reference: https://docs.astral.sh/uv/concepts/resolution/#dependency-cooldowns
[tool.uv] override-dependencies = [ -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/pyproject.toml line 118
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
This pyproject.toml configures uv but does not set a dependency cooldown. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add `exclude-newer = "7 days"` under `[tool.uv]` to wait 7 days before resolving newly published package versions. Added in: 0.9.17 Reference: https://docs.astral.sh/uv/concepts/resolution/#dependency-cooldowns
[tool.uv] index-strategy = "unsafe-best-match" # These are the same CVE fixes as with dependencies. # Keeping these here too unconditionally overrides versions even if a sub-dependency strictly requires an older version. override-dependencies = [ -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/api/creds_utils.py line 172
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Detected a python logger call with a potential hardcoded secret "Created Secret: %s in namespace %s" being logged. This may lead to secret credentials being exposed. Make sure that the logger is not logging sensitive information.
logger.info("Created Secret: %s in namespace %s", secret_name, namespace) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/kserve_migration/kserve_migration_job.yaml line 14
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Semgrep detected a Kubernetes core API ClusterRole with excessive permissions. Attaching excessive permissions to a ClusterRole associated with the core namespace allows the V1 API to perform arbitrary actions on arbitrary resources attached to the cluster. Prefer explicit allowlists of verbs/resources when configuring the core API namespace.
verbs: ["*"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/kserve_migration/kserve_migration_job_kubeflow.yaml line 14
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Semgrep detected a Kubernetes core API ClusterRole with excessive permissions. Attaching excessive permissions to a ClusterRole associated with the core namespace allows the V1 API to perform arbitrary actions on arbitrary resources attached to the cluster. Prefer explicit allowlists of verbs/resources when configuring the core API namespace.
verbs: ["*"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/pyproject.toml line 34
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
This pyproject.toml configures uv but does not set a dependency cooldown. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add `exclude-newer = "7 days"` under `[tool.uv]` to wait 7 days before resolving newly published package versions. Added in: 0.9.17 Reference: https://docs.astral.sh/uv/concepts/resolution/#dependency-cooldowns
# [tool.uv] override-dependencies) so consumers installing kserve from PyPI # also inherit the CVE fixes; override-dependencies applies to this # workspace's resolver only and is stripped from the published wheel. "aiohttp>=3.14.3", # CVE-2026-69244 "h11>=0.16.0", # CVE-2025-43859 "cryptography>=50.0.0", # GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf, PYSEC-2026-36, GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5 "python-multipart>=0.0.27", # CVE-2026-42561 "pyjwt>=2.13.0", # CVE-2026-48526 "pyasn1>=0.6.4", # CVE-2026-30922, CVE-2026-59885 "pillow>=12.3.0", # CVE-2026-40192 # OpenTelemetry packages "opentelemetry-instrumentation-fastapi<1.0.0,>=0.46b0", "opentelemetry-instrumentation-grpc<1.0.0,>=0.46b0", "opentelemetry-instrumentation-logging>=0.54b1,<1.0.0", "opentelemetry-api>=1.15.0,<2.0.0", "opentelemetry-sdk>=1.15.0,<2.0.0", "opentelemetry-exporter-otlp>=1.15.0,<2.0.0", ] name = "kserve" version = "0.21.0rc1" description = "KServe Python SDK" readme = "README.md" classifiers = [ -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/e2e-test-llmisvc.yaml line 33
- Likely real
- Yes, 98% confidence
A secret is exposed in the workflow-level `env:` block, making it available to every job and step in this workflow — including any untrusted code run in pull-request workflows. Scope secrets as narrowly as possible: prefer step-level `env:` so the secret is only available where it is actually needed.
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/e2e-test-modelcache.yaml line 28
- Likely real
- Yes, 98% confidence
A secret is exposed in the workflow-level `env:` block, making it available to every job and step in this workflow — including any untrusted code run in pull-request workflows. Scope secrets as narrowly as possible: prefer step-level `env:` so the secret is only available where it is actually needed.
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/e2e-test-quick-install.yaml line 20
- Likely real
- Yes, 98% confidence
A secret is exposed in the workflow-level `env:` block, making it available to every job and step in this workflow — including any untrusted code run in pull-request workflows. Scope secrets as narrowly as possible: prefer step-level `env:` so the secret is only available where it is actually needed.
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/e2e-test.yml line 18
- Likely real
- Yes, 98% confidence
A secret is exposed in the workflow-level `env:` block, making it available to every job and step in this workflow — including any untrusted code run in pull-request workflows. Scope secrets as narrowly as possible: prefer step-level `env:` so the secret is only available where it is actually needed.
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/install-script-generator/pkg/script_builder.py line 280
- Likely real
- Yes, 96% confidence
Detects access to sensitive files (credentials, configs, keys) [threat-filesystem-read]
file_reader.read_env_file( repo_root / "hack/setup/global-vars.env", require_assignment=True ) ) -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/install-script-generator/pkg/script_builder.py line 276
- Likely real
- Yes, 96% confidence
Detects access to sensitive files (credentials, configs, keys) [threat-filesystem-read]
kserve_deps_content = "\n".join( file_reader.read_env_file(repo_root / "kserve-deps.env") ) global_vars_content = "\n".join( -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/generate-images-sh.py line 6
- Likely real
- Yes, 96% confidence
Detects access to sensitive files (credentials, configs, keys) [threat-filesystem-read]
PROJECT_ROOT = Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent.parent INPUT = PROJECT_ROOT / "kserve-images.env" OUTPUT = PROJECT_ROOT / "kserve-images.sh" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/generate-versions-from-gomod.py line 143
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead.
with urllib.request.urlopen(api_url, timeout=10) as response: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/generate-versions-from-gomod.py line 101
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead.
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as response: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /kernelcache/mcv/capture-entrypoint.py line 297
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead.
with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=min(1, remaining)): -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /kernelcache/mcv/capture-entrypoint.py line 341
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead.
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, context=context, timeout=10): -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/verify-doc-links.py line 227
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead.
resp = urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/custom_model/model.py line 145
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
CORS policy allows any origin (using wildcard '*'). This is insecure and should be avoided.
allow_origins=["*"], -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/base-download/action.yml line 8
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/minikube-setup/action.yml line 35
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: medyagh/setup-minikube@latest -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/minikube-setup/action.yml line 26
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: azure/setup-kubectl@v4.0.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/controller/v1beta1/inferenceservice/reconcilers/ingress/path.go line 23
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/controller/v1beta1/inferenceservice/reconcilers/ingress/domain.go line 23
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/controller/v1alpha2/llmisvc/config_merge.go line 29
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/apis/serving/v1beta1/configmap.go line 25
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /kernelcache/mcv/pkg/imgbuild/utils.go line 26
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/kserve_migration/kserve_migration.sh line 78
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
The special variable IFS affects how splitting takes place when expanding unquoted variables. Don't set it globally. Prefer a dedicated utility such as 'cut' or 'awk' if you need to split input data. If you must use 'read', set IFS locally using e.g. 'IFS="," read -a my_array'.
IFS=','; isvc_split=($inference_services); unset IFS; -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/kserve_migration/kserve_migration.sh line 96
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
The special variable IFS affects how splitting takes place when expanding unquoted variables. Don't set it globally. Prefer a dedicated utility such as 'cut' or 'awk' if you need to split input data. If you must use 'read', set IFS locally using e.g. 'IFS="," read -a my_array'.
IFS=','; ksvc_split=(${knative_services}); unset IFS; -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/generate-versions-from-gomod.py line 143
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
142 api_url = f"https://api.github.com/repos/{github_repo}/releases" 143 with urllib.request.urlopen(api_url, timeout=10) as response: 144 releases = json.loads(response.read()) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/verify-doc-links.py line 227
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
226 req = Request(url, method=method, headers=headers) 227 resp = urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) 228 status = resp.code -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /kernelcache/mcv/capture-entrypoint.py line 297
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
296 try: 297 with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=min(1, remaining)): 298 logger.info("Workload readiness probe succeeded") -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/generate-versions-from-gomod.py line 101
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
100 req = Request(url, method="HEAD") 101 with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as response: 102 return 200 <= response.status < 400 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /kernelcache/mcv/capture-entrypoint.py line 341
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
340 try: 341 with urllib.request.urlopen(request, context=context, timeout=10): 342 pass -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/agent/storage/https.go line 223
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Detected a possible denial-of-service via a zip bomb attack. By limiting the max bytes read, you can mitigate this attack. `io.CopyN()` can specify a size.
if _, err = io.Copy(file, limitReader); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/agent/storage/https.go line 279
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Detected a possible denial-of-service via a zip bomb attack. By limiting the max bytes read, you can mitigate this attack. `io.CopyN()` can specify a size.
if _, err := io.Copy(newFile, limitReader); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /cmd/router/main.go line 411
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 47% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
if _, err := w.Write(prepareErrorResponse(err, "Failed to process request")); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /cmd/router/main.go line 419
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
if _, err := w.Write(response); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/logger/marshaller_parquet.go line 92
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
if _, err := w.Write(buf.Bytes()); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/logger/marshaller_json.go line 82
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
_, err = w.Write(responseBytes) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/logger/marshaller_csv.go line 95
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
if _, err := w.Write(buf.Bytes()); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/batcher/handler.go line 261
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
_, err = w.Write(rspbytes) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/protocol/rest/server.py line 136
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
135 app, 136 host="0.0.0.0", 137 port=http_port, -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/verify-doc-links.py line 55
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
54 [ 55 "0.0.0.0", 56 ":80", 57 ":90", 58 ":port", 59 ":predict", 60 ".default", 61 "blob.core.windows.net", 62 "customdomain.com", 63 "example.com", 64 "localhost", 65 "somecluster", 66 "sslip.io", 67 "svc.cluster.local", 68 "xip.io", 69 ] 70 ) 71 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 874
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.1/kserve.yaml line 912
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.1/kserve.yaml line 5155
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.1/kserve.yaml line 7770
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.1/kserve.yaml line 16516
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.1/kserve.yaml line 19398
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 4952
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 906
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0-rc1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 906
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.13.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 4606
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 7434
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 15867
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 18618
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 874
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 4354
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 6836
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 15269
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 18020
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0-rc1/kserve.yaml line 912
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0-rc1/kserve.yaml line 4497
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0-rc1/kserve.yaml line 7112
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0-rc1/kserve.yaml line 15858
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0-rc1/kserve.yaml line 18740
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 18743
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0-rc1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 4497
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0-rc1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 7112
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0-rc1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 15858
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0-rc1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 18743
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0/kserve.yaml line 912
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0/kserve.yaml line 4497
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0/kserve.yaml line 7112
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0/kserve.yaml line 15858
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0/kserve.yaml line 18740
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 906
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 4497
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 7112
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 15858
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0/kserve.yaml line 7891
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc1/kserve.yaml line 16804
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc1/kserve.yaml line 19720
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 921
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 5236
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 7881
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 16807
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 19726
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0/kserve.yaml line 927
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0/kserve.yaml line 5246
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc1/kserve.yaml line 7878
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0/kserve.yaml line 17444
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0/kserve.yaml line 20360
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.1/kserve.yaml line 927
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.1/kserve.yaml line 5246
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.1/kserve.yaml line 7891
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.1/kserve.yaml line 17444
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.1/kserve.yaml line 20360
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.13.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 921
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.13.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 7251
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 7773
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 16519
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 19404
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc0/kserve.yaml line 927
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc0/kserve.yaml line 5233
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc0/kserve.yaml line 7878
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc0/kserve.yaml line 16804
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.13.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 16804
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.11.1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 5158
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc0/kserve.yaml line 19720
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 921
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 5236
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 7881
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 16807
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 19726
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc1/kserve.yaml line 927
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.12.0-rc1/kserve.yaml line 5233
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc0/kserve.yaml line 880
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc1/kserve.yaml line 7061
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc1/kserve.yaml line 4579
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc1/kserve.yaml line 880
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 18245
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 15494
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 7061
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 4579
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc0/kserve.yaml line 18242
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc0/kserve.yaml line 15494
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc0/kserve.yaml line 7061
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc0/kserve.yaml line 4579
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.1/kserve.yaml line 18615
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/release/smoke-test-data/llmisvc-opt-125m-cpu.yaml line 18
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /config/crd/full/serving.kserve.io_servingruntimes.yaml line 3154
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /config/crd/full/serving.kserve.io_servingruntimes.yaml line 1092
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /config/crd/full/serving.kserve.io_clusterservingruntimes.yaml line 3154
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /config/crd/full/serving.kserve.io_clusterservingruntimes.yaml line 1092
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /charts/kserve-crd/templates/serving.kserve.io_servingruntimes.yaml line 3153
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /charts/kserve-crd/templates/serving.kserve.io_servingruntimes.yaml line 1091
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /charts/kserve-crd/templates/serving.kserve.io_clusterservingruntimes.yaml line 3153
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /charts/kserve-crd/templates/serving.kserve.io_clusterservingruntimes.yaml line 1091
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 874
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 7061
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc1/kserve.yaml line 15494
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.1/kserve.yaml line 15867
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.1/kserve.yaml line 7434
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.1/kserve.yaml line 4952
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.1/kserve.yaml line 880
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 18245
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 15494
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 4579
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 874
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0/kserve.yaml line 18242
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 4579
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc1/kserve.yaml line 18242
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 874
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0/kserve.yaml line 15494
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 7061
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 15494
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0-rc1/kserve_kubeflow.yaml line 18245
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0/kserve.yaml line 880
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0/kserve.yaml line 4579
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /install/v0.10.0/kserve.yaml line 7061
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 29% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
securityContext: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/xgbserver/xgbserver/__main__.py line 24
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
23 24 DEFAULT_LOCAL_MODEL_DIR = "/tmp/model" 25 DEFAULT_NTHREAD = 1 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/generate-versions-from-gomod.py line 72
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
71 def get_helm_versions(repo, chart): 72 cache_file = f"/tmp/{repo.replace('/', '_')}__{chart.replace('/', '_')}.json" 73 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /kernelcache/mcv/capture-entrypoint.py line 24
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
23 24 RESULT_PATH = os.environ.get("MCV_RESULT_PATH", "/tmp/mcv/result.json") 25 SNAPSHOT_PATH = os.environ.get( -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /kernelcache/mcv/capture-entrypoint.py line 26
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
25 SNAPSHOT_PATH = os.environ.get( 26 "MCV_SNAPSHOT_PATH", "/tmp/mcv/cache-snapshot.json" 27 ) 28 DEFAULT_READINESS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 600 29 SNAPSHOT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS = 3 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/autogluonserver/autogluonserver/runtime_paths.py line 33
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
32 if not os.environ.get("MPLCONFIGDIR"): 33 os.environ["MPLCONFIGDIR"] = "/tmp/matplotlib" 34 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/autogluonserver/autogluonserver/runtime_paths.py line 37
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
36 candidates: list[str] = [] 37 tmp = os.environ.get("TMPDIR") or "/tmp" 38 candidates.append(tmp) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/api/kserve_client.py line 524
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
Call to requests without timeout
523 ) 524 response = requests.get(url, headers=headers).status_code 525 if response == 200: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/storage/kserve_storage/kserve_storage.py line 843
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 19% confidence
Unsafe Hugging Face Hub download without revision pinning in snapshot_download()
842 kwargs["ignore_patterns"] = ignore_patterns 843 snapshot_download(**kwargs) 844 except ( -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/huggingfaceserver/huggingfaceserver/encoder_model.py line 128
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 17% confidence
Unsafe Hugging Face Hub download without revision pinning in from_pretrained()
127 else: 128 self.model_config = AutoConfig.from_pretrained( 129 self.model_id_or_path, trust_remote_code=self.trust_remote_code 130 ) 131 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/huggingfaceserver/huggingfaceserver/generative_model.py line 206
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 17% confidence
Unsafe Hugging Face Hub download without revision pinning in from_pretrained()
205 else: 206 self.model_config = AutoConfig.from_pretrained( 207 self.model_id_or_path, trust_remote_code=self.trust_remote_code 208 ) 209 if task: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/huggingfaceserver/huggingfaceserver/vllm/utils.py line 48
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 17% confidence
Unsafe Hugging Face Hub download without revision pinning in from_pretrained()
47 48 model_config = AutoConfig.from_pretrained( 49 model_config_path, trust_remote_code=trust_remote_code 50 ) 51 for architecture in model_config.architectures: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/net_url_userinfo.py line 49
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'bool'
48 'password': 'str', 49 'password_set': 'bool', 50 'username': 'str' 51 } 52 53 attribute_map = { 54 'password': 'password', -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/storage/kserve_storage/kserve_storage.py line 126
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: '/var/secrets/kserve-hdfscreds'
125 126 _HDFS_SECRET_DIRECTORY = "/var/secrets/kserve-hdfscreds" 127 _HDFS_FILE_SECRETS = ["KERBEROS_KEYTAB", "TLS_CERT", "TLS_KEY", "TLS_CA"] -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_pod_spec.py line 52
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'bool'
51 'affinity': 'V1Affinity', 52 'automount_service_account_token': 'bool', 53 'containers': 'list[V1Container]', 54 'dns_config': 'V1PodDNSConfig', 55 'dns_policy': 'str', 56 'enable_service_links': 'bool', 57 'ephemeral_containers': 'list[V1EphemeralContainer]', 58 'host_aliases': 'list[V1HostAlias]', 59 'host_ipc': 'bool', 60 'host_network': 'bool', 61 'host_pid': 'bool', 62 'host_users': 'bool', 63 'hostname': 'str', 64 'hostname_override': 'str', 65 'image_pull_secrets': 'list[V1LocalObjectReference]', 66 'init_containers': 'list[V1Container]', 67 'node_name': 'str', 68 'node_selector': 'dict(str, str)', 69 'os': 'V1PodOS', 70 'overhead': 'dict(str, ResourceQuantity)', 71 'preemption_policy': 'str', 72 'priority': 'int', 73 'priority_class_name': 'str', 74 'readiness_gates': 'list[V1PodReadinessGate]', 75 'resource_claims': 'list[V1PodResourceClaim]', 76 'resources': 'V1ResourceRequirements', 77 'restart_policy': 'str', 78 'runtime_class_name': 'str', 79 'scheduler_name': 'str', 80 'scheduling_gates': 'list[V1PodSchedulingGate]', 81 'scheduling_group': 'V1PodSchedulingGroup', 82 'security_context': 'V1PodSecurityContext', 83 'service_account': 'str', 84 'service_account_name': 'str', 85 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'bool', 86 'share_process_namespace': 'bool', 87 'subdomain': 'str', 88 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'int', 89 'tolerations': 'list[V1Toleration]', 90 'topology_spread_constraints': 'list[V1TopologySpreadConstraint]', 91 'volumes': 'list[V1Volume]' 92 } 93 94 attribute_map = { 95 'active_deadline_seconds': 'activeDeadlineSeconds', 96 'affinity': 'affinity', -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_pod_spec.py line 97
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'automountServiceAccountToken'
96 'affinity': 'affinity', 97 'automount_service_account_token': 'automountServiceAccountToken', 98 'containers': 'containers', 99 'dns_config': 'dnsConfig', 100 'dns_policy': 'dnsPolicy', 101 'enable_service_links': 'enableServiceLinks', 102 'ephemeral_containers': 'ephemeralContainers', 103 'host_aliases': 'hostAliases', 104 'host_ipc': 'hostIPC', 105 'host_network': 'hostNetwork', 106 'host_pid': 'hostPID', 107 'host_users': 'hostUsers', 108 'hostname': 'hostname', 109 'hostname_override': 'hostnameOverride', 110 'image_pull_secrets': 'imagePullSecrets', 111 'init_containers': 'initContainers', 112 'node_name': 'nodeName', 113 'node_selector': 'nodeSelector', 114 'os': 'os', 115 'overhead': 'overhead', 116 'preemption_policy': 'preemptionPolicy', 117 'priority': 'priority', 118 'priority_class_name': 'priorityClassName', 119 'readiness_gates': 'readinessGates', 120 'resource_claims': 'resourceClaims', 121 'resources': 'resources', 122 'restart_policy': 'restartPolicy', 123 'runtime_class_name': 'runtimeClassName', 124 'scheduler_name': 'schedulerName', 125 'scheduling_gates': 'schedulingGates', 126 'scheduling_group': 'schedulingGroup', 127 'security_context': 'securityContext', 128 'service_account': 'serviceAccount', 129 'service_account_name': 'serviceAccountName', 130 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'setHostnameAsFQDN', 131 'share_process_namespace': 'shareProcessNamespace', 132 'subdomain': 'subdomain', 133 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'terminationGracePeriodSeconds', 134 'tolerations': 'tolerations', 135 'topology_spread_constraints': 'topologySpreadConstraints', 136 'volumes': 'volumes' 137 } 138 139 def __init__(self, active_deadline_seconds=None, affinity=None, automount_service_account_token=None, containers=None, dns_config=None, dns_policy=None, enable_service_links=None, ephemeral_containers=None, host_aliases=None, host_ipc=None, host_network=None, host_pid=None, host_users=None, hostname=None, hostname_override=None, image_pull_secrets=None, init_containers=None, node_name=None, node_selector=None, os=None, overhead=None, preemption_policy=None, priority=None, priority_class_name=None, readiness_gates=None, resource_claims=None, resources=None, restart_policy=None, runtime_class_name=None, scheduler_name=None, scheduling_gates=None, scheduling_group=None, security_context=None, service_account=None, service_account_name=None, set_hostname_as_fqdn=None, share_process_namespace=None, subdomain=None, termination_grace_period_seconds=None, tolerations=None, topology_spread_constraints=None, volumes=None, local_vars_configuration=None): # noqa: E501 140 """V1beta1PodSpec - a model defined in OpenAPI""" # noqa: E501 141 if local_vars_configuration is None: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_predictor_spec.py line 54
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'bool'
53 'auto_scaling': 'V1beta1AutoScalingSpec', 54 'automount_service_account_token': 'bool', 55 'batcher': 'V1beta1Batcher', 56 'canary_traffic_percent': 'int', 57 'container_concurrency': 'int', 58 'containers': 'list[V1Container]', 59 'deployment_strategy': 'K8sIoApiAppsV1DeploymentStrategy', 60 'dns_config': 'V1PodDNSConfig', 61 'dns_policy': 'str', 62 'enable_service_links': 'bool', 63 'ephemeral_containers': 'list[V1EphemeralContainer]', 64 'host_aliases': 'list[V1HostAlias]', 65 'host_ipc': 'bool', 66 'host_network': 'bool', 67 'host_pid': 'bool', 68 'host_users': 'bool', 69 'hostname': 'str', 70 'hostname_override': 'str', 71 'huggingface': 'V1beta1HuggingFaceRuntimeSpec', 72 'image_pull_secrets': 'list[V1LocalObjectReference]', 73 'init_containers': 'list[V1Container]', 74 'labels': 'dict(str, str)', 75 'lightgbm': 'V1beta1LightGBMSpec', 76 'logger': 'V1beta1LoggerSpec', 77 'max_replicas': 'int', 78 'min_replicas': 'int', 79 'model': 'V1beta1ModelSpec', 80 'name': 'str', 81 'node_name': 'str', 82 'node_selector': 'dict(str, str)', 83 'onnx': 'V1beta1ONNXRuntimeSpec', 84 'os': 'V1PodOS', 85 'overhead': 'dict(str, ResourceQuantity)', 86 'paddle': 'V1beta1PaddleServerSpec', 87 'pmml': 'V1beta1PMMLSpec', 88 'preemption_policy': 'str', 89 'priority': 'int', 90 'priority_class_name': 'str', 91 'pytorch': 'V1beta1TorchServeSpec', 92 'readiness_gates': 'list[V1PodReadinessGate]', 93 'resource_claims': 'list[V1PodResourceClaim]', 94 'resources': 'V1ResourceRequirements', 95 'restart_policy': 'str', 96 'runtime_class_name': 'str', 97 'scale_metric': 'str', 98 'scale_metric_type': 'str', 99 'scale_target': 'int', 100 'scheduler_name': 'str', 101 'scheduling_gates': 'list[V1PodSchedulingGate]', 102 'scheduling_group': 'V1PodSchedulingGroup', 103 'security_context': 'V1PodSecurityContext', 104 'service_account': 'str', 105 'service_account_name': 'str', 106 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'bool', 107 'share_process_namespace': 'bool', 108 'sklearn': 'V1beta1SKLearnSpec', 109 'storage_container_name': 'str', 110 'storage_uris': 'list[V1beta1StorageUri]', 111 'subdomain': 'str', 112 'tensorflow': 'V1beta1TFServingSpec', 113 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'int', 114 'timeout': 'int', 115 'tolerations': 'list[V1Toleration]', 116 'topology_spread_constraints': 'list[V1TopologySpreadConstraint]', 117 'triton': 'V1beta1TritonSpec', 118 'volumes': 'list[V1Volume]', 119 'worker_spec': 'V1beta1WorkerSpec', 120 'xgboost': 'V1beta1XGBoostSpec' 121 } 122 123 attribute_map = { 124 'active_deadline_seconds': 'activeDeadlineSeconds', 125 'affinity': 'affinity', 126 'annotations': 'annotations', 127 'auto_scaling': 'autoScaling', -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_predictor_spec.py line 128
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'automountServiceAccountToken'
127 'auto_scaling': 'autoScaling', 128 'automount_service_account_token': 'automountServiceAccountToken', 129 'batcher': 'batcher', 130 'canary_traffic_percent': 'canaryTrafficPercent', 131 'container_concurrency': 'containerConcurrency', 132 'containers': 'containers', 133 'deployment_strategy': 'deploymentStrategy', 134 'dns_config': 'dnsConfig', 135 'dns_policy': 'dnsPolicy', 136 'enable_service_links': 'enableServiceLinks', 137 'ephemeral_containers': 'ephemeralContainers', 138 'host_aliases': 'hostAliases', 139 'host_ipc': 'hostIPC', 140 'host_network': 'hostNetwork', 141 'host_pid': 'hostPID', 142 'host_users': 'hostUsers', 143 'hostname': 'hostname', 144 'hostname_override': 'hostnameOverride', 145 'huggingface': 'huggingface', 146 'image_pull_secrets': 'imagePullSecrets', 147 'init_containers': 'initContainers', 148 'labels': 'labels', 149 'lightgbm': 'lightgbm', 150 'logger': 'logger', 151 'max_replicas': 'maxReplicas', 152 'min_replicas': 'minReplicas', 153 'model': 'model', 154 'name': 'name', 155 'node_name': 'nodeName', 156 'node_selector': 'nodeSelector', 157 'onnx': 'onnx', 158 'os': 'os', 159 'overhead': 'overhead', 160 'paddle': 'paddle', 161 'pmml': 'pmml', 162 'preemption_policy': 'preemptionPolicy', 163 'priority': 'priority', 164 'priority_class_name': 'priorityClassName', 165 'pytorch': 'pytorch', 166 'readiness_gates': 'readinessGates', 167 'resource_claims': 'resourceClaims', 168 'resources': 'resources', 169 'restart_policy': 'restartPolicy', 170 'runtime_class_name': 'runtimeClassName', 171 'scale_metric': 'scaleMetric', 172 'scale_metric_type': 'scaleMetricType', 173 'scale_target': 'scaleTarget', 174 'scheduler_name': 'schedulerName', 175 'scheduling_gates': 'schedulingGates', 176 'scheduling_group': 'schedulingGroup', 177 'security_context': 'securityContext', 178 'service_account': 'serviceAccount', 179 'service_account_name': 'serviceAccountName', 180 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'setHostnameAsFQDN', 181 'share_process_namespace': 'shareProcessNamespace', 182 'sklearn': 'sklearn', 183 'storage_container_name': 'storageContainerName', 184 'storage_uris': 'storageUris', 185 'subdomain': 'subdomain', 186 'tensorflow': 'tensorflow', 187 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'terminationGracePeriodSeconds', 188 'timeout': 'timeout', 189 'tolerations': 'tolerations', 190 'topology_spread_constraints': 'topologySpreadConstraints', 191 'triton': 'triton', 192 'volumes': 'volumes', 193 'worker_spec': 'workerSpec', 194 'xgboost': 'xgboost' 195 } 196 197 def __init__(self, active_deadline_seconds=None, affinity=None, annotations=None, auto_scaling=None, automount_service_account_token=None, batcher=None, canary_traffic_percent=None, container_concurrency=None, containers=None, deployment_strategy=None, dns_config=None, dns_policy=None, enable_service_links=None, ephemeral_containers=None, host_aliases=None, host_ipc=None, host_network=None, host_pid=None, host_users=None, hostname=None, hostname_override=None, huggingface=None, image_pull_secrets=None, init_containers=None, labels=None, lightgbm=None, logger=None, max_replicas=None, min_replicas=None, model=None, name=None, node_name=None, node_selector=None, onnx=None, os=None, overhead=None, paddle=None, pmml=None, preemption_policy=None, priority=None, priority_class_name=None, pytorch=None, readiness_gates=None, resource_claims=None, resources=None, restart_policy=None, runtime_class_name=None, scale_metric=None, scale_metric_type=None, scale_target=None, scheduler_name=None, scheduling_gates=None, scheduling_group=None, security_context=None, service_account=None, service_account_name=None, set_hostname_as_fqdn=None, share_process_namespace=None, sklearn=None, storage_container_name=None, storage_uris=None, subdomain=None, tensorflow=None, termination_grace_period_seconds=None, timeout=None, tolerations=None, topology_spread_constraints=None, triton=None, volumes=None, worker_spec=None, xgboost=None, local_vars_configuration=None): # noqa: E501 198 """V1beta1PredictorSpec - a model defined in OpenAPI""" # noqa: E501 199 if local_vars_configuration is None: 200 local_vars_configuration = Configuration() 201 self.local_vars_configuration = local_vars_configuration -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_security_config.py line 50
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'bool'
49 openapi_types = { 50 'auto_mount_service_account_token': 'bool' 51 } 52 53 attribute_map = { -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_transformer_spec.py line 54
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'bool'
53 'auto_scaling': 'V1beta1AutoScalingSpec', 54 'automount_service_account_token': 'bool', 55 'batcher': 'V1beta1Batcher', 56 'canary_traffic_percent': 'int', 57 'container_concurrency': 'int', 58 'containers': 'list[V1Container]', 59 'deployment_strategy': 'K8sIoApiAppsV1DeploymentStrategy', 60 'dns_config': 'V1PodDNSConfig', 61 'dns_policy': 'str', 62 'enable_service_links': 'bool', 63 'ephemeral_containers': 'list[V1EphemeralContainer]', 64 'host_aliases': 'list[V1HostAlias]', 65 'host_ipc': 'bool', 66 'host_network': 'bool', 67 'host_pid': 'bool', 68 'host_users': 'bool', 69 'hostname': 'str', 70 'hostname_override': 'str', 71 'image_pull_secrets': 'list[V1LocalObjectReference]', 72 'init_containers': 'list[V1Container]', 73 'labels': 'dict(str, str)', 74 'logger': 'V1beta1LoggerSpec', 75 'max_replicas': 'int', 76 'min_replicas': 'int', 77 'node_name': 'str', 78 'node_selector': 'dict(str, str)', 79 'os': 'V1PodOS', 80 'overhead': 'dict(str, ResourceQuantity)', 81 'preemption_policy': 'str', 82 'priority': 'int', 83 'priority_class_name': 'str', 84 'readiness_gates': 'list[V1PodReadinessGate]', 85 'resource_claims': 'list[V1PodResourceClaim]', 86 'resources': 'V1ResourceRequirements', 87 'restart_policy': 'str', 88 'runtime_class_name': 'str', 89 'scale_metric': 'str', 90 'scale_metric_type': 'str', 91 'scale_target': 'int', 92 'scheduler_name': 'str', 93 'scheduling_gates': 'list[V1PodSchedulingGate]', 94 'scheduling_group': 'V1PodSchedulingGroup', 95 'security_context': 'V1PodSecurityContext', 96 'service_account': 'str', 97 'service_account_name': 'str', 98 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'bool', 99 'share_process_namespace': 'bool', 100 'storage_uris': 'list[V1beta1StorageUri]', 101 'subdomain': 'str', 102 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'int', 103 'timeout': 'int', 104 'tolerations': 'list[V1Toleration]', 105 'topology_spread_constraints': 'list[V1TopologySpreadConstraint]', 106 'volumes': 'list[V1Volume]' 107 } 108 109 attribute_map = { 110 'active_deadline_seconds': 'activeDeadlineSeconds', 111 'affinity': 'affinity', 112 'annotations': 'annotations', 113 'auto_scaling': 'autoScaling', -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_transformer_spec.py line 114
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'automountServiceAccountToken'
113 'auto_scaling': 'autoScaling', 114 'automount_service_account_token': 'automountServiceAccountToken', 115 'batcher': 'batcher', 116 'canary_traffic_percent': 'canaryTrafficPercent', 117 'container_concurrency': 'containerConcurrency', 118 'containers': 'containers', 119 'deployment_strategy': 'deploymentStrategy', 120 'dns_config': 'dnsConfig', 121 'dns_policy': 'dnsPolicy', 122 'enable_service_links': 'enableServiceLinks', 123 'ephemeral_containers': 'ephemeralContainers', 124 'host_aliases': 'hostAliases', 125 'host_ipc': 'hostIPC', 126 'host_network': 'hostNetwork', 127 'host_pid': 'hostPID', 128 'host_users': 'hostUsers', 129 'hostname': 'hostname', 130 'hostname_override': 'hostnameOverride', 131 'image_pull_secrets': 'imagePullSecrets', 132 'init_containers': 'initContainers', 133 'labels': 'labels', 134 'logger': 'logger', 135 'max_replicas': 'maxReplicas', 136 'min_replicas': 'minReplicas', 137 'node_name': 'nodeName', 138 'node_selector': 'nodeSelector', 139 'os': 'os', 140 'overhead': 'overhead', 141 'preemption_policy': 'preemptionPolicy', 142 'priority': 'priority', 143 'priority_class_name': 'priorityClassName', 144 'readiness_gates': 'readinessGates', 145 'resource_claims': 'resourceClaims', 146 'resources': 'resources', 147 'restart_policy': 'restartPolicy', 148 'runtime_class_name': 'runtimeClassName', 149 'scale_metric': 'scaleMetric', 150 'scale_metric_type': 'scaleMetricType', 151 'scale_target': 'scaleTarget', 152 'scheduler_name': 'schedulerName', 153 'scheduling_gates': 'schedulingGates', 154 'scheduling_group': 'schedulingGroup', 155 'security_context': 'securityContext', 156 'service_account': 'serviceAccount', 157 'service_account_name': 'serviceAccountName', 158 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'setHostnameAsFQDN', 159 'share_process_namespace': 'shareProcessNamespace', 160 'storage_uris': 'storageUris', 161 'subdomain': 'subdomain', 162 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'terminationGracePeriodSeconds', 163 'timeout': 'timeout', 164 'tolerations': 'tolerations', 165 'topology_spread_constraints': 'topologySpreadConstraints', 166 'volumes': 'volumes' 167 } 168 169 def __init__(self, active_deadline_seconds=None, affinity=None, annotations=None, auto_scaling=None, automount_service_account_token=None, batcher=None, canary_traffic_percent=None, container_concurrency=None, containers=None, deployment_strategy=None, dns_config=None, dns_policy=None, enable_service_links=None, ephemeral_containers=None, host_aliases=None, host_ipc=None, host_network=None, host_pid=None, host_users=None, hostname=None, hostname_override=None, image_pull_secrets=None, init_containers=None, labels=None, logger=None, max_replicas=None, min_replicas=None, node_name=None, node_selector=None, os=None, overhead=None, preemption_policy=None, priority=None, priority_class_name=None, readiness_gates=None, resource_claims=None, resources=None, restart_policy=None, runtime_class_name=None, scale_metric=None, scale_metric_type=None, scale_target=None, scheduler_name=None, scheduling_gates=None, scheduling_group=None, security_context=None, service_account=None, service_account_name=None, set_hostname_as_fqdn=None, share_process_namespace=None, storage_uris=None, subdomain=None, termination_grace_period_seconds=None, timeout=None, tolerations=None, topology_spread_constraints=None, volumes=None, local_vars_configuration=None): # noqa: E501 170 """V1beta1TransformerSpec - a model defined in OpenAPI""" # noqa: E501 171 if local_vars_configuration is None: 172 local_vars_configuration = Configuration() 173 self.local_vars_configuration = local_vars_configuration -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_worker_spec.py line 52
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'bool'
51 'affinity': 'V1Affinity', 52 'automount_service_account_token': 'bool', 53 'containers': 'list[V1Container]', 54 'dns_config': 'V1PodDNSConfig', 55 'dns_policy': 'str', 56 'enable_service_links': 'bool', 57 'ephemeral_containers': 'list[V1EphemeralContainer]', 58 'host_aliases': 'list[V1HostAlias]', 59 'host_ipc': 'bool', 60 'host_network': 'bool', 61 'host_pid': 'bool', 62 'host_users': 'bool', 63 'hostname': 'str', 64 'hostname_override': 'str', 65 'image_pull_secrets': 'list[V1LocalObjectReference]', 66 'init_containers': 'list[V1Container]', 67 'node_name': 'str', 68 'node_selector': 'dict(str, str)', 69 'os': 'V1PodOS', 70 'overhead': 'dict(str, ResourceQuantity)', 71 'pipeline_parallel_size': 'int', 72 'preemption_policy': 'str', 73 'priority': 'int', 74 'priority_class_name': 'str', 75 'readiness_gates': 'list[V1PodReadinessGate]', 76 'resource_claims': 'list[V1PodResourceClaim]', 77 'resources': 'V1ResourceRequirements', 78 'restart_policy': 'str', 79 'runtime_class_name': 'str', 80 'scheduler_name': 'str', 81 'scheduling_gates': 'list[V1PodSchedulingGate]', 82 'scheduling_group': 'V1PodSchedulingGroup', 83 'security_context': 'V1PodSecurityContext', 84 'service_account': 'str', 85 'service_account_name': 'str', 86 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'bool', 87 'share_process_namespace': 'bool', 88 'subdomain': 'str', 89 'tensor_parallel_size': 'int', 90 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'int', 91 'tolerations': 'list[V1Toleration]', 92 'topology_spread_constraints': 'list[V1TopologySpreadConstraint]', 93 'volumes': 'list[V1Volume]' 94 } 95 96 attribute_map = { 97 'active_deadline_seconds': 'activeDeadlineSeconds', 98 'affinity': 'affinity', -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_worker_spec.py line 99
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'automountServiceAccountToken'
98 'affinity': 'affinity', 99 'automount_service_account_token': 'automountServiceAccountToken', 100 'containers': 'containers', 101 'dns_config': 'dnsConfig', 102 'dns_policy': 'dnsPolicy', 103 'enable_service_links': 'enableServiceLinks', 104 'ephemeral_containers': 'ephemeralContainers', 105 'host_aliases': 'hostAliases', 106 'host_ipc': 'hostIPC', 107 'host_network': 'hostNetwork', 108 'host_pid': 'hostPID', 109 'host_users': 'hostUsers', 110 'hostname': 'hostname', 111 'hostname_override': 'hostnameOverride', 112 'image_pull_secrets': 'imagePullSecrets', 113 'init_containers': 'initContainers', 114 'node_name': 'nodeName', 115 'node_selector': 'nodeSelector', 116 'os': 'os', 117 'overhead': 'overhead', 118 'pipeline_parallel_size': 'pipelineParallelSize', 119 'preemption_policy': 'preemptionPolicy', 120 'priority': 'priority', 121 'priority_class_name': 'priorityClassName', 122 'readiness_gates': 'readinessGates', 123 'resource_claims': 'resourceClaims', 124 'resources': 'resources', 125 'restart_policy': 'restartPolicy', 126 'runtime_class_name': 'runtimeClassName', 127 'scheduler_name': 'schedulerName', 128 'scheduling_gates': 'schedulingGates', 129 'scheduling_group': 'schedulingGroup', 130 'security_context': 'securityContext', 131 'service_account': 'serviceAccount', 132 'service_account_name': 'serviceAccountName', 133 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'setHostnameAsFQDN', 134 'share_process_namespace': 'shareProcessNamespace', 135 'subdomain': 'subdomain', 136 'tensor_parallel_size': 'tensorParallelSize', 137 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'terminationGracePeriodSeconds', 138 'tolerations': 'tolerations', 139 'topology_spread_constraints': 'topologySpreadConstraints', 140 'volumes': 'volumes' 141 } 142 143 def __init__(self, active_deadline_seconds=None, affinity=None, automount_service_account_token=None, containers=None, dns_config=None, dns_policy=None, enable_service_links=None, ephemeral_containers=None, host_aliases=None, host_ipc=None, host_network=None, host_pid=None, host_users=None, hostname=None, hostname_override=None, image_pull_secrets=None, init_containers=None, node_name=None, node_selector=None, os=None, overhead=None, pipeline_parallel_size=None, preemption_policy=None, priority=None, priority_class_name=None, readiness_gates=None, resource_claims=None, resources=None, restart_policy=None, runtime_class_name=None, scheduler_name=None, scheduling_gates=None, scheduling_group=None, security_context=None, service_account=None, service_account_name=None, set_hostname_as_fqdn=None, share_process_namespace=None, subdomain=None, tensor_parallel_size=None, termination_grace_period_seconds=None, tolerations=None, topology_spread_constraints=None, volumes=None, local_vars_configuration=None): # noqa: E501 144 """V1beta1WorkerSpec - a model defined in OpenAPI""" # noqa: E501 145 if local_vars_configuration is None: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_explainer_spec.py line 116
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'automountServiceAccountToken'
115 'auto_scaling': 'autoScaling', 116 'automount_service_account_token': 'automountServiceAccountToken', 117 'batcher': 'batcher', 118 'canary_traffic_percent': 'canaryTrafficPercent', 119 'container_concurrency': 'containerConcurrency', 120 'containers': 'containers', 121 'deployment_strategy': 'deploymentStrategy', 122 'dns_config': 'dnsConfig', 123 'dns_policy': 'dnsPolicy', 124 'enable_service_links': 'enableServiceLinks', 125 'ephemeral_containers': 'ephemeralContainers', 126 'host_aliases': 'hostAliases', 127 'host_ipc': 'hostIPC', 128 'host_network': 'hostNetwork', 129 'host_pid': 'hostPID', 130 'host_users': 'hostUsers', 131 'hostname': 'hostname', 132 'hostname_override': 'hostnameOverride', 133 'image_pull_secrets': 'imagePullSecrets', 134 'init_containers': 'initContainers', 135 'labels': 'labels', 136 'logger': 'logger', 137 'max_replicas': 'maxReplicas', 138 'min_replicas': 'minReplicas', 139 'node_name': 'nodeName', 140 'node_selector': 'nodeSelector', 141 'os': 'os', 142 'overhead': 'overhead', 143 'preemption_policy': 'preemptionPolicy', 144 'priority': 'priority', 145 'priority_class_name': 'priorityClassName', 146 'readiness_gates': 'readinessGates', 147 'resource_claims': 'resourceClaims', 148 'resources': 'resources', 149 'restart_policy': 'restartPolicy', 150 'runtime_class_name': 'runtimeClassName', 151 'scale_metric': 'scaleMetric', 152 'scale_metric_type': 'scaleMetricType', 153 'scale_target': 'scaleTarget', 154 'scheduler_name': 'schedulerName', 155 'scheduling_gates': 'schedulingGates', 156 'scheduling_group': 'schedulingGroup', 157 'security_context': 'securityContext', 158 'service_account': 'serviceAccount', 159 'service_account_name': 'serviceAccountName', 160 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'setHostnameAsFQDN', 161 'share_process_namespace': 'shareProcessNamespace', 162 'storage_uris': 'storageUris', 163 'subdomain': 'subdomain', 164 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'terminationGracePeriodSeconds', 165 'timeout': 'timeout', 166 'tolerations': 'tolerations', 167 'topology_spread_constraints': 'topologySpreadConstraints', 168 'volumes': 'volumes' 169 } 170 171 def __init__(self, active_deadline_seconds=None, affinity=None, annotations=None, art=None, auto_scaling=None, automount_service_account_token=None, batcher=None, canary_traffic_percent=None, container_concurrency=None, containers=None, deployment_strategy=None, dns_config=None, dns_policy=None, enable_service_links=None, ephemeral_containers=None, host_aliases=None, host_ipc=None, host_network=None, host_pid=None, host_users=None, hostname=None, hostname_override=None, image_pull_secrets=None, init_containers=None, labels=None, logger=None, max_replicas=None, min_replicas=None, node_name=None, node_selector=None, os=None, overhead=None, preemption_policy=None, priority=None, priority_class_name=None, readiness_gates=None, resource_claims=None, resources=None, restart_policy=None, runtime_class_name=None, scale_metric=None, scale_metric_type=None, scale_target=None, scheduler_name=None, scheduling_gates=None, scheduling_group=None, security_context=None, service_account=None, service_account_name=None, set_hostname_as_fqdn=None, share_process_namespace=None, storage_uris=None, subdomain=None, termination_grace_period_seconds=None, timeout=None, tolerations=None, topology_spread_constraints=None, volumes=None, local_vars_configuration=None): # noqa: E501 172 """V1beta1ExplainerSpec - a model defined in OpenAPI""" # noqa: E501 173 if local_vars_configuration is None: 174 local_vars_configuration = Configuration() 175 self.local_vars_configuration = local_vars_configuration 176 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_explainer_spec.py line 55
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'bool'
54 'auto_scaling': 'V1beta1AutoScalingSpec', 55 'automount_service_account_token': 'bool', 56 'batcher': 'V1beta1Batcher', 57 'canary_traffic_percent': 'int', 58 'container_concurrency': 'int', 59 'containers': 'list[V1Container]', 60 'deployment_strategy': 'K8sIoApiAppsV1DeploymentStrategy', 61 'dns_config': 'V1PodDNSConfig', 62 'dns_policy': 'str', 63 'enable_service_links': 'bool', 64 'ephemeral_containers': 'list[V1EphemeralContainer]', 65 'host_aliases': 'list[V1HostAlias]', 66 'host_ipc': 'bool', 67 'host_network': 'bool', 68 'host_pid': 'bool', 69 'host_users': 'bool', 70 'hostname': 'str', 71 'hostname_override': 'str', 72 'image_pull_secrets': 'list[V1LocalObjectReference]', 73 'init_containers': 'list[V1Container]', 74 'labels': 'dict(str, str)', 75 'logger': 'V1beta1LoggerSpec', 76 'max_replicas': 'int', 77 'min_replicas': 'int', 78 'node_name': 'str', 79 'node_selector': 'dict(str, str)', 80 'os': 'V1PodOS', 81 'overhead': 'dict(str, ResourceQuantity)', 82 'preemption_policy': 'str', 83 'priority': 'int', 84 'priority_class_name': 'str', 85 'readiness_gates': 'list[V1PodReadinessGate]', 86 'resource_claims': 'list[V1PodResourceClaim]', 87 'resources': 'V1ResourceRequirements', 88 'restart_policy': 'str', 89 'runtime_class_name': 'str', 90 'scale_metric': 'str', 91 'scale_metric_type': 'str', 92 'scale_target': 'int', 93 'scheduler_name': 'str', 94 'scheduling_gates': 'list[V1PodSchedulingGate]', 95 'scheduling_group': 'V1PodSchedulingGroup', 96 'security_context': 'V1PodSecurityContext', 97 'service_account': 'str', 98 'service_account_name': 'str', 99 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'bool', 100 'share_process_namespace': 'bool', 101 'storage_uris': 'list[V1beta1StorageUri]', 102 'subdomain': 'str', 103 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'int', 104 'timeout': 'int', 105 'tolerations': 'list[V1Toleration]', 106 'topology_spread_constraints': 'list[V1TopologySpreadConstraint]', 107 'volumes': 'list[V1Volume]' 108 } 109 110 attribute_map = { 111 'active_deadline_seconds': 'activeDeadlineSeconds', 112 'affinity': 'affinity', 113 'annotations': 'annotations', 114 'art': 'art', 115 'auto_scaling': 'autoScaling', -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_custom_transformer.py line 97
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'automountServiceAccountToken'
96 'affinity': 'affinity', 97 'automount_service_account_token': 'automountServiceAccountToken', 98 'containers': 'containers', 99 'dns_config': 'dnsConfig', 100 'dns_policy': 'dnsPolicy', 101 'enable_service_links': 'enableServiceLinks', 102 'ephemeral_containers': 'ephemeralContainers', 103 'host_aliases': 'hostAliases', 104 'host_ipc': 'hostIPC', 105 'host_network': 'hostNetwork', 106 'host_pid': 'hostPID', 107 'host_users': 'hostUsers', 108 'hostname': 'hostname', 109 'hostname_override': 'hostnameOverride', 110 'image_pull_secrets': 'imagePullSecrets', 111 'init_containers': 'initContainers', 112 'node_name': 'nodeName', 113 'node_selector': 'nodeSelector', 114 'os': 'os', 115 'overhead': 'overhead', 116 'preemption_policy': 'preemptionPolicy', 117 'priority': 'priority', 118 'priority_class_name': 'priorityClassName', 119 'readiness_gates': 'readinessGates', 120 'resource_claims': 'resourceClaims', 121 'resources': 'resources', 122 'restart_policy': 'restartPolicy', 123 'runtime_class_name': 'runtimeClassName', 124 'scheduler_name': 'schedulerName', 125 'scheduling_gates': 'schedulingGates', 126 'scheduling_group': 'schedulingGroup', 127 'security_context': 'securityContext', 128 'service_account': 'serviceAccount', 129 'service_account_name': 'serviceAccountName', 130 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'setHostnameAsFQDN', 131 'share_process_namespace': 'shareProcessNamespace', 132 'subdomain': 'subdomain', 133 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'terminationGracePeriodSeconds', 134 'tolerations': 'tolerations', 135 'topology_spread_constraints': 'topologySpreadConstraints', 136 'volumes': 'volumes' 137 } 138 139 def __init__(self, active_deadline_seconds=None, affinity=None, automount_service_account_token=None, containers=None, dns_config=None, dns_policy=None, enable_service_links=None, ephemeral_containers=None, host_aliases=None, host_ipc=None, host_network=None, host_pid=None, host_users=None, hostname=None, hostname_override=None, image_pull_secrets=None, init_containers=None, node_name=None, node_selector=None, os=None, overhead=None, preemption_policy=None, priority=None, priority_class_name=None, readiness_gates=None, resource_claims=None, resources=None, restart_policy=None, runtime_class_name=None, scheduler_name=None, scheduling_gates=None, scheduling_group=None, security_context=None, service_account=None, service_account_name=None, set_hostname_as_fqdn=None, share_process_namespace=None, subdomain=None, termination_grace_period_seconds=None, tolerations=None, topology_spread_constraints=None, volumes=None, local_vars_configuration=None): # noqa: E501 140 """V1beta1CustomTransformer - a model defined in OpenAPI""" # noqa: E501 141 if local_vars_configuration is None: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_custom_transformer.py line 52
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'bool'
51 'affinity': 'V1Affinity', 52 'automount_service_account_token': 'bool', 53 'containers': 'list[V1Container]', 54 'dns_config': 'V1PodDNSConfig', 55 'dns_policy': 'str', 56 'enable_service_links': 'bool', 57 'ephemeral_containers': 'list[V1EphemeralContainer]', 58 'host_aliases': 'list[V1HostAlias]', 59 'host_ipc': 'bool', 60 'host_network': 'bool', 61 'host_pid': 'bool', 62 'host_users': 'bool', 63 'hostname': 'str', 64 'hostname_override': 'str', 65 'image_pull_secrets': 'list[V1LocalObjectReference]', 66 'init_containers': 'list[V1Container]', 67 'node_name': 'str', 68 'node_selector': 'dict(str, str)', 69 'os': 'V1PodOS', 70 'overhead': 'dict(str, ResourceQuantity)', 71 'preemption_policy': 'str', 72 'priority': 'int', 73 'priority_class_name': 'str', 74 'readiness_gates': 'list[V1PodReadinessGate]', 75 'resource_claims': 'list[V1PodResourceClaim]', 76 'resources': 'V1ResourceRequirements', 77 'restart_policy': 'str', 78 'runtime_class_name': 'str', 79 'scheduler_name': 'str', 80 'scheduling_gates': 'list[V1PodSchedulingGate]', 81 'scheduling_group': 'V1PodSchedulingGroup', 82 'security_context': 'V1PodSecurityContext', 83 'service_account': 'str', 84 'service_account_name': 'str', 85 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'bool', 86 'share_process_namespace': 'bool', 87 'subdomain': 'str', 88 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'int', 89 'tolerations': 'list[V1Toleration]', 90 'topology_spread_constraints': 'list[V1TopologySpreadConstraint]', 91 'volumes': 'list[V1Volume]' 92 } 93 94 attribute_map = { 95 'active_deadline_seconds': 'activeDeadlineSeconds', 96 'affinity': 'affinity', -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_custom_predictor.py line 97
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'automountServiceAccountToken'
96 'affinity': 'affinity', 97 'automount_service_account_token': 'automountServiceAccountToken', 98 'containers': 'containers', 99 'dns_config': 'dnsConfig', 100 'dns_policy': 'dnsPolicy', 101 'enable_service_links': 'enableServiceLinks', 102 'ephemeral_containers': 'ephemeralContainers', 103 'host_aliases': 'hostAliases', 104 'host_ipc': 'hostIPC', 105 'host_network': 'hostNetwork', 106 'host_pid': 'hostPID', 107 'host_users': 'hostUsers', 108 'hostname': 'hostname', 109 'hostname_override': 'hostnameOverride', 110 'image_pull_secrets': 'imagePullSecrets', 111 'init_containers': 'initContainers', 112 'node_name': 'nodeName', 113 'node_selector': 'nodeSelector', 114 'os': 'os', 115 'overhead': 'overhead', 116 'preemption_policy': 'preemptionPolicy', 117 'priority': 'priority', 118 'priority_class_name': 'priorityClassName', 119 'readiness_gates': 'readinessGates', 120 'resource_claims': 'resourceClaims', 121 'resources': 'resources', 122 'restart_policy': 'restartPolicy', 123 'runtime_class_name': 'runtimeClassName', 124 'scheduler_name': 'schedulerName', 125 'scheduling_gates': 'schedulingGates', 126 'scheduling_group': 'schedulingGroup', 127 'security_context': 'securityContext', 128 'service_account': 'serviceAccount', 129 'service_account_name': 'serviceAccountName', 130 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'setHostnameAsFQDN', 131 'share_process_namespace': 'shareProcessNamespace', 132 'subdomain': 'subdomain', 133 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'terminationGracePeriodSeconds', 134 'tolerations': 'tolerations', 135 'topology_spread_constraints': 'topologySpreadConstraints', 136 'volumes': 'volumes' 137 } 138 139 def __init__(self, active_deadline_seconds=None, affinity=None, automount_service_account_token=None, containers=None, dns_config=None, dns_policy=None, enable_service_links=None, ephemeral_containers=None, host_aliases=None, host_ipc=None, host_network=None, host_pid=None, host_users=None, hostname=None, hostname_override=None, image_pull_secrets=None, init_containers=None, node_name=None, node_selector=None, os=None, overhead=None, preemption_policy=None, priority=None, priority_class_name=None, readiness_gates=None, resource_claims=None, resources=None, restart_policy=None, runtime_class_name=None, scheduler_name=None, scheduling_gates=None, scheduling_group=None, security_context=None, service_account=None, service_account_name=None, set_hostname_as_fqdn=None, share_process_namespace=None, subdomain=None, termination_grace_period_seconds=None, tolerations=None, topology_spread_constraints=None, volumes=None, local_vars_configuration=None): # noqa: E501 140 """V1beta1CustomPredictor - a model defined in OpenAPI""" # noqa: E501 141 if local_vars_configuration is None: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_custom_predictor.py line 52
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'bool'
51 'affinity': 'V1Affinity', 52 'automount_service_account_token': 'bool', 53 'containers': 'list[V1Container]', 54 'dns_config': 'V1PodDNSConfig', 55 'dns_policy': 'str', 56 'enable_service_links': 'bool', 57 'ephemeral_containers': 'list[V1EphemeralContainer]', 58 'host_aliases': 'list[V1HostAlias]', 59 'host_ipc': 'bool', 60 'host_network': 'bool', 61 'host_pid': 'bool', 62 'host_users': 'bool', 63 'hostname': 'str', 64 'hostname_override': 'str', 65 'image_pull_secrets': 'list[V1LocalObjectReference]', 66 'init_containers': 'list[V1Container]', 67 'node_name': 'str', 68 'node_selector': 'dict(str, str)', 69 'os': 'V1PodOS', 70 'overhead': 'dict(str, ResourceQuantity)', 71 'preemption_policy': 'str', 72 'priority': 'int', 73 'priority_class_name': 'str', 74 'readiness_gates': 'list[V1PodReadinessGate]', 75 'resource_claims': 'list[V1PodResourceClaim]', 76 'resources': 'V1ResourceRequirements', 77 'restart_policy': 'str', 78 'runtime_class_name': 'str', 79 'scheduler_name': 'str', 80 'scheduling_gates': 'list[V1PodSchedulingGate]', 81 'scheduling_group': 'V1PodSchedulingGroup', 82 'security_context': 'V1PodSecurityContext', 83 'service_account': 'str', 84 'service_account_name': 'str', 85 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'bool', 86 'share_process_namespace': 'bool', 87 'subdomain': 'str', 88 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'int', 89 'tolerations': 'list[V1Toleration]', 90 'topology_spread_constraints': 'list[V1TopologySpreadConstraint]', 91 'volumes': 'list[V1Volume]' 92 } 93 94 attribute_map = { 95 'active_deadline_seconds': 'activeDeadlineSeconds', 96 'affinity': 'affinity', -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_custom_explainer.py line 97
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'automountServiceAccountToken'
96 'affinity': 'affinity', 97 'automount_service_account_token': 'automountServiceAccountToken', 98 'containers': 'containers', 99 'dns_config': 'dnsConfig', 100 'dns_policy': 'dnsPolicy', 101 'enable_service_links': 'enableServiceLinks', 102 'ephemeral_containers': 'ephemeralContainers', 103 'host_aliases': 'hostAliases', 104 'host_ipc': 'hostIPC', 105 'host_network': 'hostNetwork', 106 'host_pid': 'hostPID', 107 'host_users': 'hostUsers', 108 'hostname': 'hostname', 109 'hostname_override': 'hostnameOverride', 110 'image_pull_secrets': 'imagePullSecrets', 111 'init_containers': 'initContainers', 112 'node_name': 'nodeName', 113 'node_selector': 'nodeSelector', 114 'os': 'os', 115 'overhead': 'overhead', 116 'preemption_policy': 'preemptionPolicy', 117 'priority': 'priority', 118 'priority_class_name': 'priorityClassName', 119 'readiness_gates': 'readinessGates', 120 'resource_claims': 'resourceClaims', 121 'resources': 'resources', 122 'restart_policy': 'restartPolicy', 123 'runtime_class_name': 'runtimeClassName', 124 'scheduler_name': 'schedulerName', 125 'scheduling_gates': 'schedulingGates', 126 'scheduling_group': 'schedulingGroup', 127 'security_context': 'securityContext', 128 'service_account': 'serviceAccount', 129 'service_account_name': 'serviceAccountName', 130 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'setHostnameAsFQDN', 131 'share_process_namespace': 'shareProcessNamespace', 132 'subdomain': 'subdomain', 133 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'terminationGracePeriodSeconds', 134 'tolerations': 'tolerations', 135 'topology_spread_constraints': 'topologySpreadConstraints', 136 'volumes': 'volumes' 137 } 138 139 def __init__(self, active_deadline_seconds=None, affinity=None, automount_service_account_token=None, containers=None, dns_config=None, dns_policy=None, enable_service_links=None, ephemeral_containers=None, host_aliases=None, host_ipc=None, host_network=None, host_pid=None, host_users=None, hostname=None, hostname_override=None, image_pull_secrets=None, init_containers=None, node_name=None, node_selector=None, os=None, overhead=None, preemption_policy=None, priority=None, priority_class_name=None, readiness_gates=None, resource_claims=None, resources=None, restart_policy=None, runtime_class_name=None, scheduler_name=None, scheduling_gates=None, scheduling_group=None, security_context=None, service_account=None, service_account_name=None, set_hostname_as_fqdn=None, share_process_namespace=None, subdomain=None, termination_grace_period_seconds=None, tolerations=None, topology_spread_constraints=None, volumes=None, local_vars_configuration=None): # noqa: E501 140 """V1beta1CustomExplainer - a model defined in OpenAPI""" # noqa: E501 141 if local_vars_configuration is None: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_custom_explainer.py line 52
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'bool'
51 'affinity': 'V1Affinity', 52 'automount_service_account_token': 'bool', 53 'containers': 'list[V1Container]', 54 'dns_config': 'V1PodDNSConfig', 55 'dns_policy': 'str', 56 'enable_service_links': 'bool', 57 'ephemeral_containers': 'list[V1EphemeralContainer]', 58 'host_aliases': 'list[V1HostAlias]', 59 'host_ipc': 'bool', 60 'host_network': 'bool', 61 'host_pid': 'bool', 62 'host_users': 'bool', 63 'hostname': 'str', 64 'hostname_override': 'str', 65 'image_pull_secrets': 'list[V1LocalObjectReference]', 66 'init_containers': 'list[V1Container]', 67 'node_name': 'str', 68 'node_selector': 'dict(str, str)', 69 'os': 'V1PodOS', 70 'overhead': 'dict(str, ResourceQuantity)', 71 'preemption_policy': 'str', 72 'priority': 'int', 73 'priority_class_name': 'str', 74 'readiness_gates': 'list[V1PodReadinessGate]', 75 'resource_claims': 'list[V1PodResourceClaim]', 76 'resources': 'V1ResourceRequirements', 77 'restart_policy': 'str', 78 'runtime_class_name': 'str', 79 'scheduler_name': 'str', 80 'scheduling_gates': 'list[V1PodSchedulingGate]', 81 'scheduling_group': 'V1PodSchedulingGroup', 82 'security_context': 'V1PodSecurityContext', 83 'service_account': 'str', 84 'service_account_name': 'str', 85 'set_hostname_as_fqdn': 'bool', 86 'share_process_namespace': 'bool', 87 'subdomain': 'str', 88 'termination_grace_period_seconds': 'int', 89 'tolerations': 'list[V1Toleration]', 90 'topology_spread_constraints': 'list[V1TopologySpreadConstraint]', 91 'volumes': 'list[V1Volume]' 92 } 93 94 attribute_map = { 95 'active_deadline_seconds': 'activeDeadlineSeconds', 96 'affinity': 'affinity', -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/huggingfaceserver/huggingfaceserver/generative_model.py line 272
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: '[PAD]'
271 if not self._tokenizer.pad_token: 272 pad_token_str = "[PAD]" 273 logger.warning( -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/huggingfaceserver/huggingfaceserver/encoder_model.py line 200
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: '[PAD]'
199 if not self._tokenizer.pad_token: 200 pad_token_str = "[PAD]" 201 logger.warning( -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/v1beta1_security_config.py line 54
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'autoMountServiceAccountToken'
53 attribute_map = { 54 'auto_mount_service_account_token': 'autoMountServiceAccountToken' 55 } 56 57 def __init__(self, auto_mount_service_account_token=False, local_vars_configuration=None): # noqa: E501 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/constants/constants.py line 52
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY'
51 S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID_DEFAULT_NAME = "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID" 52 S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY_DEFAULT_NAME = "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY" 53 S3_DEFAULT_CREDS_FILE = "~/.aws/credentials" -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/custom_tokenizer/tokenization.py line 293
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: '[UNK]'
292 293 def __init__(self, vocab, unk_token="[UNK]", max_input_chars_per_word=200): 294 self.vocab = vocab 295 self.unk_token = unk_token 296 self.max_input_chars_per_word = max_input_chars_per_word 297 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/net_url_userinfo.py line 55
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'passwordSet'
54 'password': 'password', 55 'password_set': 'passwordSet', 56 'username': 'username' 57 } 58 59 def __init__(self, password=None, password_set=None, username=None): # noqa: E501 60 """NetUrlUserinfo - a model defined in Swagger""" # noqa: E501 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/models/net_url_userinfo.py line 48
- Likely real
- Yes, 94% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'str'
47 openapi_types = { 48 'password': 'str', 49 'password_set': 'bool', 50 'username': 'str' 51 } 52 53 attribute_map = { -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/storage/kserve_storage/kserve_storage.py line 452
- Likely real
- Yes, 93% confidence
Detects reading of environment variables (credential access, often contains secrets) [threat-runtime-environment-read]
temp_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp() os.environ["HDFS_SECRET_DIR"] = temp_dir for key, value in storage_secret_json.items(): mode = "w" -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/storage/kserve_storage/kserve_storage.py line 1010
- Likely real
- Yes, 93% confidence
Detects reading of environment variables (credential access, often contains secrets) [threat-runtime-environment-read]
if os.environ.get("HDFS_SECRET_DIR"): secret_dir = os.environ["HDFS_SECRET_DIR"] for filename in os.listdir(secret_dir): -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/storage/kserve_storage/kserve_storage.py line 1368
- Likely real
- Yes, 93% confidence
Detects reading of environment variables (credential access, often contains secrets) [threat-runtime-environment-read]
client_id = os.getenv("AZ_CLIENT_ID", "") client_secret = os.getenv("AZ_CLIENT_SECRET", "") # convert old environment variable to conform Azure defaults -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/autogluonserver/autogluonserver/safe_deserialize.py line 20
- Likely real
- Yes, 92% confidence
Consider possible security implications associated with pickletools module.
19 import os 20 import pickletools 21 import zipfile -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/constants/constants.py line 47
- Likely real
- Yes, 91% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: 'kserve-secret-'
46 INFERENCESERVICE_SYSTEM_NAMESPACE = "kserve" 47 DEFAULT_SECRET_NAME = "kserve-secret-" 48 DEFAULT_SA_NAME = "kserve-service-credentials" -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/configuration.py line 318
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 45% confidence
Possible hardcoded password: ''
317 username = self.username 318 password = "" 319 if self.password is not None: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/generate-versions-from-gomod.py line 153
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 28% confidence
Try, Except, Continue detected.
152 same_minor_versions.append((tag, r_patch)) 153 except Exception: 154 continue 155 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/generate-versions-from-gomod.py line 7
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 13% confidence
Consider possible security implications associated with the subprocess module.
6 import re 7 import subprocess 8 import sys -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/install-script-generator/pkg/manifest_builder.py line 19
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 13% confidence
Consider possible security implications associated with the subprocess module.
18 19 import subprocess 20 from pathlib import Path -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /kernelcache/mcv/capture-entrypoint.py line 9
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 13% confidence
Consider possible security implications associated with the subprocess module.
8 import ssl 9 import subprocess 10 import threading -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/install-script-generator/pkg/manifest_builder.py line 70
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 3% confidence
subprocess call - check for execution of untrusted input.
69 try: 70 result = subprocess.run( 71 [kustomize_bin, "build", str(kustomize_dir)], 72 capture_output=True, 73 text=True, 74 check=True, 75 cwd=kustomize_dir.parent, 76 ) 77 return result.stdout -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /kernelcache/mcv/capture-entrypoint.py line 207
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 3% confidence
subprocess call - check for execution of untrusted input.
206 try: 207 process = subprocess.Popen(command, start_new_session=True) 208 except OSError: -
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0/llmisvc-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0/keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0/llmisvc-autoscaling-hpa-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0/llmisvc-autoscaling-keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0/kserve-knative-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0/llmisvc-autoscaling-hpa-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0/kserve-standard-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0/keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0/kserve-knative-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0/kserve-knative-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0/kserve-standard-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0-rc0/llmisvc-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0-rc0/kserve-knative-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0-rc0/llmisvc-autoscaling-keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0-rc0/kserve-standard-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0-rc0/keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0-rc1/kserve-knative-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0-rc0/llmisvc-autoscaling-hpa-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0-rc1/kserve-standard-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0/kserve-standard-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0/llmisvc-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
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- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/api/kserve_client.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/third_party/pip-licenses.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
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- File
- /python/predictiveserver/README.md
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
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- File
- /python/huggingfaceserver/health_check.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
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- File
- /python/storage/kserve_storage/confidential/cdh_client.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
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- File
- /python/storage/kserve_storage/kserve_storage.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
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- File
- /kernelcache/mcv/mcv.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /kernelcache/mcv/capture-entrypoint.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0-rc1/llmisvc-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0-rc1/kserve-standard-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0-rc1/keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
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- File
- /install/v0.18.0-rc1/kserve-knative-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
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- File
- /install/v0.18.0/llmisvc-autoscaling-keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0-rc0/kserve-standard-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
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- File
- /hack/setup/quick-install/kserve-knative-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/quick-install/llmisvc-autoscaling-keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/quick-install/localmodel-full-install-helm.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/quick-install/llmisvc-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/quick-install/localmodel-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0/llmisvc-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.github/workflows/prepare-release.yml
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
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- File
- /install/v0.17.0-rc0/kserve-knative-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.github/workflows/go.yml
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
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- File
- /install/v0.17.0-rc1/kserve-knative-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0-rc0/keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0-rc1/kserve-standard-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/quick-install/keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0-rc0/kserve-knative-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0-rc0/kserve-standard-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0-rc0/llmisvc-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0-rc0/kserve-standard-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc1/llmisvc-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0-rc0/keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0-rc0/kserve-standard-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0/llmisvc-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0-rc0/kserve-knative-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0-rc0/llmisvc-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0-rc0/kserve-knative-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0-rc1/keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/quick-install/localmodel-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/quick-install/llmisvc-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0-rc0/llmisvc-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0-rc0/llmisvc-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/quick-install/kserve-standard-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/quick-install/kserve-knative-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0-rc0/llmisvc-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0-rc1/llmisvc-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0-rc0/kserve-knative-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0-rc0/kserve-standard-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/verify-doc-links.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/kserve_migration/Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/python-sdk/client-gen.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0-rc1/kserve-standard-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/quick-install/kserve-knative-mode-full-install-helm.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/scripts/generate-versions-from-gomod.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/cli/install-kind.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/cli/install-shellcheck.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/cli/install-kustomize.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/cli/install-helm.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/cli/install-yq.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/cli/install-uv.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/quick-install/llmisvc-autoscaling-hpa-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/quick-install/kserve-standard-mode-full-install-helm.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/quick-install/llmisvc-full-install-helm.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /hack/setup/quick-install/kserve-standard-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0/kserve-knative-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc1/localmodel-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc1/keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc1/kserve-standard-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc1/llmisvc-autoscaling-keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0-rc1/llmisvc-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc1/kserve-knative-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc1/llmisvc-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc1/localmodel-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0/llmisvc-autoscaling-hpa-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0/keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0/llmisvc-autoscaling-keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0/kserve-standard-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc1/llmisvc-autoscaling-hpa-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0/llmisvc-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0-rc0/kserve-knative-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc0/localmodel-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0-rc0/kserve-standard-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0/kserve-knative-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0/kserve-standard-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc0/llmisvc-autoscaling-hpa-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc0/kserve-standard-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc0/keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc0/llmisvc-autoscaling-keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc0/kserve-knative-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc0/llmisvc-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc1/kserve-standard-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0-rc1/kserve-knative-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0-rc1/llmisvc-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0-rc0/kserve-standard-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0-rc0/llmisvc-autoscaling-hpa-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0-rc0/kserve-knative-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0/kserve-knative-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0-rc0/keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0-rc0/llmisvc-autoscaling-keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0-rc0/llmisvc-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc0/llmisvc-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0/kserve-standard-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc1/kserve-knative-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc0/localmodel-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0-rc0/llmisvc-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0/keda-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.19.0/llmisvc-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0/kserve-standard-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0/kserve-knative-mode-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.17.0/llmisvc-dependency-install.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0/kserve-knative-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.18.0/llmisvc-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.20.0/kserve-standard-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc0/kserve-standard-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /install/v0.21.0-rc0/kserve-knative-mode-full-install-with-manifests.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/rest.py line 145
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
Use of assert detected. The enclosed code will be removed when compiling to optimised byte code.
144 method = method.upper() 145 assert method in ['GET', 'HEAD', 'DELETE', 'POST', 'PUT', 146 'PATCH', 'OPTIONS'] 147 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/kserve/kserve/protocol/rest/multiprocess/server.py line 94
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
Use of assert detected. The enclosed code will be removed when compiling to optimised byte code.
93 if self._process.exitcode is None: # Process is still running 94 assert self._process.pid is not None 95 if os.name == "nt": -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/custom_tokenizer/data_processing.py line 453
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
Use of assert detected. The enclosed code will be removed when compiling to optimised byte code.
452 453 assert len(nbest_json) >= 1 454 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/custom_tokenizer/data_processing.py line 432
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
Use of assert detected. The enclosed code will be removed when compiling to optimised byte code.
431 432 assert len(nbest) >= 1 433 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/custom_tokenizer/data_processing.py line 164
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
Use of assert detected. The enclosed code will be removed when compiling to optimised byte code.
163 assert len(input_mask) == max_seq_length 164 assert len(segment_ids) == max_seq_length 165 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/custom_tokenizer/data_processing.py line 163
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
Use of assert detected. The enclosed code will be removed when compiling to optimised byte code.
162 assert len(input_ids) == max_seq_length 163 assert len(input_mask) == max_seq_length 164 assert len(segment_ids) == max_seq_length -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/custom_tokenizer/data_processing.py line 162
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
Use of assert detected. The enclosed code will be removed when compiling to optimised byte code.
161 162 assert len(input_ids) == max_seq_length 163 assert len(input_mask) == max_seq_length
No findings match these filters.